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et al.: Education Article

EDUCATION ARTICLE
N.Y CoNST. art. XI, § 1:
The legislature shall provide for the maintenance and support
of a system of free common schools, wherein all the children of
this state may be educated.
SUPREME COURT
NASSAU COUNTY
Reform Education Financing Inequities Today v. Cuomo 2 79
(decided December 12, 1991)

The supreme court was presented with the challenging issue of
whether the court should declare New York State's system of
funding public education unconstitutional because it resulted in
significant budgetary disparities between low-wealth and highwealth districts to the detriment of the districts, students and
taxpayers. 2 80 Plaintiff, Reform Education Financing Inequities
Today (REFIT), contended that the state's educational financial
scheme failed to comply with the education article of the New
York State Constitution, 2 81 was contrived from property tax
valuation in violation of the equal protection clause of the New
York State Constitution, 2 82 and violated the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States
Constitution. 2 83 Despite the court's awareness of the present
279. No. 2500/91, 1991 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 725, at *1 (Sup. Ct. Nassau
County Dec. 12, 1991).
280. IL at *2.
281. Id.; N.Y. CONST. art. X, § 1.
282. N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 11. ("No person shall be denied the equal
protection of the laws of this state or any subdivision thereof. No person shall,
because of race, color, creed or religion, be subjected to any discrimination in
his civil rights by... the state or any agency or subdivision of the state.").
Id.
283. REFIT, 1991 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 725, at *2; U. S. CONST. amend.
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inequities created in funding public education, the court, in
complying with the basic policy of separation of powers, refused
to alter the legislatively enacted educational funding scheme,

holding that any alterations must come from the New York Court
of Appeals or by legislative action. 2 84 Consequently, the court
2 85
dismissed the action.

To date, there are fifty-one different formulas devised by the
legislature to distribute limited state aid to the various districts
within the state. 286 Within the past year, there has been no new
legislative action to alleviate financial disparities, only budgetary
2 87
cuts which render such disparities even more pervasive.

In rendering its decision, the court acknowledged that the issue
of school funding significantly impacted the future of the
state. 2 88 The court stated that "[e]ducation is paramount in

preparing our children to function in Society as citizens and
workers." ' 289 However, the basis of the court's decision to

dismiss the action rested primarily on its reliance on the
reasoning and holding of the court of appeals in Board of
Education, Levittown Union Free School District v. Nyquist.2 90
XIV, § 1.
284. REFIT, 1991 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 725, at *23.
285. Id.
286. Id. at *10.
287. Id. at *15-*16.
288. Id. at *1.
289. Id.
290. 57 N.Y.2d 27, 439 N.E.2d 359, 453 N.Y.S.2d 643 (1982), appeal
dismissed, 459 U.S. 1138 (1983). In Levittown, the plaintiffs claimed that an
educational funding law, which provided that funds raised by local taxes be
augmented by allocations of state funds, resulted in grossly disparate financial
support. Consequently, this violated the equal protection clauses of the state,
and federal constitutions, in addition to the education article of the state
constitution. Id. at 35, 439 N.E.2d at 361, 453 N.Y.S.2d at 646; see also
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; N.Y. CONST. art. XI, § 1. Plaintiff's cause of
action was based solely on the disparity of expenditures per pupil between the
low-wealth districts and the high-wealth districts. Levittown, 57 N.Y.2d at 36,
439 N.E.2d at 362, 453 N.Y.S.2d at 646. However, there was no claim that
any student was denied an education nor that the quality of education fell short
of the minimum standards set forth by the Board of Regents. Id. at 38, 439
N.E.2d at 363, 453 N.Y.S.2d at 647-48.
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The court, in Levittown, stated that the constitutional language of
the education article 29 1 contained no indication of a requirement
that the education provided by the state be equal or substantially
equivalent in every district. 292 Rather, the Levittown court
determined that "[w]hat appears to have been contemplated when
the education article was adopted... was a State-wide system
assuring minimal acceptable facilities and services" 2 93 and to
"provide for maintenance and support of a system of free schools
in order that an education might be available to all the State's
children." ' 294 Thus, the intent motivating the adoption of the
education article in 1894 was to assure "minimal acceptable
facilities and services in contrast to the unsystematized delivery
of instruction then in existence within the State." 295
The court of appeals, in Levittown, discarded the equal protec296
tion claims by applying the rational basis standard of review.
The funding scheme was upheld despite disparities in per pupil
expenditures among the various districts, which were primarily
attributed to the unequal varying real property tax bases or unequal demands on local revenue within each district.
The court of appeals asserted that extreme deference would be
given to legislative decisions and that they would not be
overridden absent "gross and glaring inadequacy" resulting from
legislative formulas designed to finance the state's public
schools. 297 Such provisions were determined to be peculiarly
appropriate for formulation by the legislature. However, as the
court in REFIT pointed out, it is unclear as to whether "gross and
291. N.Y. CONST. art XI, § 1.
292. Levittown, 57 N.Y.2d at 47, 439 N.E.2d at 368, 453 N.Y.S.2d at
652.

293. Id. at 47, 439 N.E.2d at 368, 453 N.Y.S.2d at 653.
294. Id. at 48, 439 N.E.2d at 368, 453 N.Y.S.2d at 653.
295. Id.
296. Id. at 43, 439 N.E.2d at 365-66, 453 N.Y.S.2d at 650. The court of
appeals found that the public school funding scheme had a rational relationship

to the legitimate state purpose which was "the preservation and promotion of
local control of education [which] is both a legitimate State interest and one to
which the present financing system is reasonably related." Id. at 44, 439
N.E.2d at 366, 453 N.Y.S.2d at 651.
297. Id. at 47-49, 439 N.E.2d at 369, 453 N.Y.S.2d at 653.

Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 1992

3

Touro Law Review, Vol. 8, No. 3 [1992], Art. 18

882

TOURO LAW REVIEW

[Vol 8

glaring inadequacy" was intended to refer to the funding of
2 98
education or the quality of the education.
In REFIT, plaintiffs contended that in light of the changes that
have evolved since Levittown, the current funding of education
has resulted in the "gross and glaring inadequacy" which would
merit judicial action to correct the malfunctioning legislative
scheme. The court agreed that what constituted the exception in
29 9
Levittown had now become the rule.
Although it is conceded that the state aid formulas produce less
than half the money spent by the schools, and that districts rely
largely on their own resources, the court noted that the growing
disparities between poor districts and wealthy districts were not
attributable to inadequate tax efforts on the part of the poorer
districts because some of the most inadequately financed districts
were among the highest tax rate districts of the state. 300 In addition to state budgetary cuts, which the wealthier districts have
been able to absorb, 30 1 poorer districts have been faced with an
increasing "high-risk" student population, 30 2 coupled with state
imposed mandates that the state does not provide funds to implement. 30 3 Hence, minimal budgetary expenditures are depleted
rapidly.
The state maintains that the holding in Levittown requires a
298. REFIT, 1991 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 725, at *8. The plaintiffs, in REFIT,
did not claim the education level in their district was either below the
minimum standard or inadequate. Rather, they contended that the "'gross and
glaring inadequacy'... found absent a decade ago, now exists in that the gap
between rich and poor districts has widened dramatically since Levittown." Id.
299. Id. at *8-*9. To date, "the maximum disparity in Suffolk is nearly 330
to 1, disparities of 100 to 1 are not uncommon, and 19 Suffolk districts are 16
times richer than William Floyd and Wyandanch (a ratio observed in
Levittown only in the most extreme single case)." Id. at *9.The plaintiffs also
revealed a growing disparity in per-pupil expenditure; ranging from $7,107 to
$43,000 per pupil. Whereas at the time Levittown was decided, disparities of 4
to 1 have risen to 6 to 1.Id.
300. Id. at *10.
301. Id. at *16-*17.
302. Id. at *11-*12. High-risk student populations include minority groups
who require special programs in English. They also include handicapped
students who require special facilities. Id.
303. Id. at *12 (for example asbestos removal).
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showing of "gross and glaring inadequacy" with respect to the
quality of education and that the students in the poorer districts
are receiving a "minimum" standard of education. However, the
court indicates that no such "minimum" standard has been articulated to date. 304
The court considered it ironic that "everyone from the governor to legislators to various committees proclaim it is a travesty
to allow property wealth to determine the quality of educating the
children, yet the New York State school finance scheme remains
unimproved." ' 305 The court recognized that the judiciary has a
"duty to evaluate the fulfillment of the constitutionally imposed
obligation of the legislature."' 30 6 In support of its argument, the
court noted that in Baker v. Carr,307 "the United States Supreme
Court departed from a line of precedents insulating such 'political
questions' as legislative apportionment from judicial inquiry and in so doing, opened the door to a revolution in constitutional
adjudication. ' ' 308 Also, various other states have moved toward
judicial intervention in public school financing often finding the
disparities plaintiffs complain of as violative of equal protection
at both state and federal levels, as well as a violation of state ed309
ucation clauses.
Noting that there is a direct correlation between disparities in
education funding and the quality of education, the court stated
that "'to the extent educational quality is deemed related to dollar
expenditure, it tends to prove inadequate quality of education in
the poorer districts .. .,,,31o While the court stated it would be
304. Id. at *12-*13. The court provided a historical evolution of legislative
formulas used to determine district allowances. However, none of the formulas
defined the "minimum" standard in the quality of education articulated in
Levittown. Id. at *13-*16.
305. Id. at *17.
306. Id.
307. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
308. REFIT, 1991 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 725, at *17-*18.
309. Id. at *18-*22; see Abbott v. Burke, 575 A.2d 359 (N.J. 1990); Rose
v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186 (Ky. 1989); Helena
Elementary Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. State, 769 P.2d 684 (Mont. 1989); Serrano v.
Priest, 487 P.2d 1241 (Cal. 1971).
310. REFIT, 191 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 725, at *21 (quoting Abbot, 575 A.2d
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"foolhardy to believe that money alone would solve the problems
of our educational system," it acknowledged that the poorer students' "educational needs are often dramatically different from
3 11
those of students in affluent districts."
The United States Supreme Court, in San Antonio Independent
School District v. Rodriguez, held that the right to education is
not a fundamental right. 3 12 The Court rejected the plaintiffs'
argument that "education is distinguishable from other services
and benefits provided by the State because it bears a peculiarly
close relationship to other rights and liberties accorded protection
under the Constitution." ' 3 13 Rather, the Court found that there
was "no charge. . . that the system fails to provide each child
with an opportunity to acquire the basic minimal skills necessary
for the enjoyment of' 3 14 the other rights protected under the
Constitution.
Despite the recognition of the present inequities in funding
public education, the REFIT court noted that the "'[primary
responsibility for the provision of fair and equitable education
opportunity within the financial capabilities of our State's
taxpayers unquestionably rests with [the legislative] branch of our
government.' 315 The basic policy of separation of powers
prevented the court from declaring the state's educational funding
scheme unconstitutional. Thus, the court determined that any
deviation from the Levittown holding must be made either by the

at 384).
311. Id.at *22.

312. 411 U.S. 1, 3 (1972).
313. Id. at 35.
314. Id. at 37.
315. REFIT, 191 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 725, at *24 (quoting Levittown, 57
N.Y.2d at 48, 439 N.E.2d at 369, 453 N.Y.S.2d at 653).
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court of appeals or the legislature. 3 16 In the event of an appeal, it
appears that the state supreme court has provided adequate
reasons to make this deviation.

316. Id. at *25.
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